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Pretrial Detention and Bail
Megan Stevenson* and Sandra G. Mayson†
Our current pretrial system imposes high costs on both the
people who are detained pretrial and the taxpayers who foot the
bill. These costs have prompted a surge of bail reform around
the country. Reformers seek to reduce pretrial detention rates,
as well as racial and socioeconomic disparities in the pretrial
system, while simultaneously improving appearance rates and
reducing pretrial crime. The current state of pretrial practice
suggests that there is ample room for improvement. Bail hearings
are often cursory, taking little time to evaluate a defendant’s
risks, needs, or ability to pay. Money-bail practices lead to high
rates of detention even among misdemeanor defendants and
those who pose no serious risk of crime or flight. Infrequent
evaluation means that the judges and magistrates who set bail
have little information about how their bail-setting practices
affect detention, appearance, and crime rates. Practical and
low-cost interventions, such as court reminder systems, are
underutilized. To promote lasting reform, this chapter identifies
pretrial strategies that are both within the state’s authority
and supported by empirical research. These interventions
should be designed with input from stakeholders, and carefully
evaluated to ensure that the desired improvements are achieved.
INTRODUCTION
The scope of pretrial detention in the United States is vast. Pretrial
detainees account for two-thirds of jail inmates and 95% of the growth in
the jail population over the last 20 years.1 There are 11 million jail admissions
annually; on any given day, local jails house almost half a million people who
are awaiting trial.2 The U.S. pretrial detention rate, compared to the total
population, is higher than in any European or Asian country.3

*

Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University.
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
1.
Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Jail
Inmates at Midyear 2014, at 1 (2015).
2.
Id. at 3.
3.
See, e.g., Roy Walmsley, World Pretrial/Remand Imprisonment List 2-6 (1st ed. 2013).
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Pretrial detention has profound costs. In fiscal terms, the total annual cost
of pretrial jail beds is estimated to be $14 billion, or 17% of total spending on
corrections.4 At the individual level, pretrial detention can result in the loss
of employment, housing or child custody, in addition to the loss of freedom.
Pretrial detention also affects case outcomes. No fewer than five empirical
studies published in the last year, deploying quasi-experimental design, have
shown that pretrial detention causally increases a defendant’s chance of
conviction, as well as the likely sentence length.5 The increase in convictions
is primarily an increase in guilty pleas among defendants who otherwise
would have had their charges dropped. The plea-inducing effect of detention
undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself—especially if
some of those convicted are innocent. Finally, two recent studies have found
evidence that pretrial detention increases the likelihood that a person will
commit future crime.6 This may be because jail exposes defendants to negative
peer influence,7 or because it has a destabilizing effect on defendants’ lives.
Given the costs of pretrial detention, one might expect that detention
decisions would be made with care. This is not how the system currently
operates. For the most part, whether a person is detained pretrial depends
solely on whether he can afford the bail amount set in his case. Nationwide, 9
out of 10 felony defendants who were detained pretrial in 2009 (the last year
for which the data is published) had bail set and would have been released if
4.
Pretrial Justice Inst., Pretrial Justice: How Much Does It Cost? 2 (2017); Melissa S.
Kearney et al., The Hamilton Project, Ten Economic Facts about Crime and Incarceration in the
United States 13 (2014).
5.
See, e.g., Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges 3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22511, 2016), www.nber.org/papers/w22511; Arpit
Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from
Judge Randomization 22 (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 531, 2016), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2774453; Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711 (2017); Emily Leslie &
Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence
from NYC Arraignments 34-35 (July 20, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
home.uchicago.edu/~npope/pretrial_paper.pdf; Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How
the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes (January 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/mstevens/workingpapers/Distortion-ofJustice-April-2016.pdf.
6.
Gupta et al., supra note 5; Heaton et al., supra note 5. But see Stevenson, supra note 5
(finding no future-crime effects); Dobbie et al., supra note 5 (same).
7.
Patrick Bayer et al., Building Criminal Capital Behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections,
124 Q. J. Econ. 105, 105 (2009); Megan Stevenson, Breaking Bad: Social Influence and the Path to
Criminality in Juvenile Jails 1 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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they had posted it.8 Even at relatively low bail amounts, detention rates are
high. In Philadelphia, between 2008 and 2013, 40% of defendants with bail
set at $500 remained jailed pretrial.9 Over the same time period in Houston,
more than half of all misdemeanor defendants were detained pending trial;
their average bail amount was $2,786.10 Some pretrial detainees are facing very
serious charges, but most are not: At least as of 2002, 65% of pretrial detainees
were held on nonviolent charges only, and 20% were charged with minor
public-order offenses.11 The hearings at which bail is set—and which have such
serious consequences—are typically rapid and informal.
In the last few years, the hefty costs of pretrial detention have generated
growing interest in bail reform. Jurisdictions around the country are now
rewriting their pretrial law and policy. They aspire to reduce pretrial detention
rates, as well as racial and socioeconomic disparities in the pretrial system,
without increasing rates of non-appearance or pretrial crime. The overarching
reform vision is to shift from the “resource-based” system of money bail to
a “risk-based” system, in which pretrial interventions are tied to risk rather
than wealth.12 To accomplish this, jurisdictions are implementing actuarial risk
assessment and reducing the use of money bail as a mediator of release. The
idea is that defendants who pose little statistical risk of flight (i.e., fleeing the
jurisdiction) or committing pretrial crime can be released without money bail
or onerous conditions. Riskier defendants can be released under supervision,
and detention can be reserved for those so likely to flee or commit serious
harm that the risk cannot be managed in any less intrusive way. (In practice,
however, risk-assessment tools do not actually measure flight- and crime-risk;
rather, they measure nonappearance- and arrest-risk, a point discussed at
greater length below.)
This chapter offers a critical discussion of central pretrial reform initiatives,
drawing on recent scholarship. We hope to provide readers with a deeper
understanding of ongoing academic and policy debates around key reform goals:
reducing the use of money bail, reducing racial disparities in pretrial detention,
8.
Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Felony Defendants in
Large Urban Counties, 2009—Statistical Tables 1, 15 (2013).
9.
Stevenson, supra note 5, at 12.
10.
Heaton et al., supra note 5, at 736 tbl. 1.
11.
Doris S. James, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Profile of Jail Inmates,
2002, at 3 (2004).
12.
See, e.g., Christopher Moraff, U.S. Cities Are Looking for Alternatives to Cash Bail, Next
City (Mar. 24, 2016), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/cities-alternatives-cash-bail; Pretrial
Justice Inst., Rational and Transparent Bail Decision Making: Moving From a Cash-Based to a
Risk-Based Process (2012).
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evaluating risk of crime or flight, rationalizing pretrial detention, and tailoring
conditions of release. In each area, we note the current direction of reform, survey
relevant scholarship, and offer our own perspective on the best prospects for
effective and lasting change. We evaluate pretrial reform initiatives on the basis
of several criteria: effectiveness in promoting public safety and court appearance,
intrusiveness to individual liberty, cost, and impact on racial and socioeconomic
disparity.13 Part I provides background. Part II is our substantive discussion. The
chapter concludes with recommendations based on key reform priorities.
I. THE PRETRIAL SYSTEM
A. STRUCTURE AND HISTORY
The pretrial phase begins when a judicial officer or grand jury determines
that there is probable cause to support a criminal charge, and it ends when
the charge is adjudicated or dismissed. Once the state has charged someone,
it has a strong interest in ensuring the integrity of the ensuing proceeding—
including ensuring that the defendant appears in court and does not interfere
with witnesses or evidence. The state also has an interest, as it always does,
in preventing future crime, and some defendants may be particularly crimeprone. So the core goals of the pretrial system are to (1) ensure defendants’
appearance, (2) prevent obstruction of justice, and (3) prevent other pretrial
crime, all while minimizing intrusions to defendants’ liberty.14
Since the turn of the 20th century, the primary mechanism for ensuring
defendants’ appearance has been money bail, or a “secured financial bond.”15 A
defendant deposits the specified bail amount with the court as security for his
appearance at future proceedings. If he does appear, the deposit is returned at the
conclusion of the case. This system has inspired three waves of reform. The first,
in the 1960s, sought to reduce the pretrial detention of the poor by limiting the
13.
For further guidance on bail reform, see, for example, Am. Bar Ass’n, Standards for
Criminal Justice: Pretrial Release (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ABA Standards]; Crim. Just. Pol’y
Program, Harvard Law School, Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform (2016);
Timothy R. Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and
a Framework for American Pretrial Reform 21-44 (2014); and The Solution, Pretrial Justice
Inst., http://www.pretrial.org/solutions (last visited Mar. 25, 2017). The general principles these
sources articulate represent broadly held views among contemporary reformers, policymakers
and academics.
14.
ABA Standards, supra note 13, § 10-1.1.
15.
See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 21-40. Prior to that time, the system relied on the
unsecured pledges of personal sureties. Id.; cf. William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws
of England 296 (1769) (explaining that an accused required to give bail must “put in securities
for his appearance, to answer the charge against him”).
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use of money bail in favor of unsecured release (“release on recognizance”).16 But
rising crime during the 1970s and 1980s prompted a second reform movement,
this time directed at incapacitating dangerous defendants.17 The Bail Reform
Act of 1984 authorized federal courts to order pretrial detention without bail
on the basis of a defendant’s dangerousness.18 Many states followed suit. Every
jurisdiction except New York also authorized courts to consider public safety
in imposing bail or other conditions of release.19 More recently, money bail has
been on the rise and rates of release on recognizance have declined.20 The current
wave of reform seeks to reverse that trend.
B. CURRENT PRACTICE
In practice, bail hearings are a messy affair. Every person who is arrested is
entitled to a judicial determination, within 48 hours, that there is probable cause
to believe she has committed a crime.21 Many jurisdictions combine this with
a bail hearing (or “pretrial release hearing”). It is common for such hearings
to last only a few minutes. They are often held over videoconference with no
defense counsel present. The presiding official may be a magistrate rather than
a judge, and may not even be a lawyer. Available evidence suggests that the bail
judges do not often take the time to make a careful determination about what
bail an arrestee can realistically afford. Some jurisdictions use bail schedules that
prescribe a set bail amount for each offense.22 In others, statutory law directs
judges to consider various factors in imposing bail or alternative conditions of
release.23 These statutes provide little guidance about how to weigh the factors,
or which conditions of release are appropriate to manage different pretrial risks.
16.
See, e.g., John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 2 (1985).
17.
See generally id.
18.
Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976-87 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-50, 3062).
19.
Goldkamp, supra note 16, at 56 & n.57.
20.
Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts 2 (2007) (reporting that from 19901994, 41% of pretrial releases were on recognizance and 24% were by cash bail; from 2002-2004,
23% of releases were on recognizance and 42% were by cash bail); Reaves, supra note 8, at 15
(“Between 1990 and 2009, the percentage of pretrial releases involving financial conditions rose
from 37% to 61%.”).
21.
Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126
(1975).
22.
Pretrial Justice Inst., Pretrial Justice in America: A Survey of County Pretrial Release
Policies, Practices and Outcomes 7 (2009) (reporting that 64% of surveyed counties use a bail
schedule).
23.
See, e.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 837, 866 (describing state statutes).
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In most cases, a monetary bail amount is set, and in most cases, the defendant
need not pay it directly to be released. Three mechanisms have developed for
subsidizing bail. The dominant one is the commercial bail bond industry.24
Commercial bail bondsmen charge defendants a non-refundable fee—usually
around 10% of the total bail amount—for the service of posting the bond.
Because of concern about the effect of this industry on defendants’ incentive
to appear and on the fairness of the process, some jurisdictions have outlawed
it. Others have developed their own partial-deposit systems, which allow
defendants to obtain release by depositing only a percentage of the total bail
amount with the court.25 A third, less common, mechanism is the community
bail fund: a nonprofit organization that posts bail on defendants’ behalf.26
C. LAW AND POLICY
The Supreme Court has affirmed that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm,
and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”27 A
set of federal constitutional provisions protect pretrial liberty. Most importantly,
perhaps, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit the state from
conditioning a person’s liberty on payment of an amount that she cannot afford
unless it has no other way to achieve an important state interest.28 Since 2015, a
number of federal district courts have held that fixed money-bail schedules, which

24.
Cohen & Reaves, supra note 20, at 4 (showing that 48% of all pretrial releases studied
were based on financial conditions, most of which—33% of all releases—were on surety bond);
About Us, Am. Bail Coalition, www.americanbailcoalition.org (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (“The
American Bail Coalition is a trade association made up of national bail insurance companies ....”).
25.
E.g., Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private
Law Enforcement From Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & Econ. 93, 94 (2004).
26.
See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 585, 600 (2017) (noting that
community bail funds have proliferated recently, motivated by “beliefs regarding the overuse of
pretrial detention”).
27.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
28.
See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983) (holding that to “deprive the
probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot
pay the fine ... would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth
Amendment”); see also Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Varden v. City of Clanton,
No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala., Feb. 13, 2015) (“Incarcerating individuals solely because
of their inability to pay for their release ... violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”) (citing Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971)); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,
240-41 (1970); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961)). But see Brief for Amici Curiae Am.
Bail Coalition et al., Walker v. Calhoun, No. 16-10521 (11th Cir. June 21, 2016) (arguing that this
line of case law has no application in the pretrial context).
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do not take ability to pay into account, violate these provisions.29 Relatedly, the
Eighth Amendment prohibits “excessive” bail.30 This requires an individualized
bail determination: Bail must be “reasonably calculated” to ensure the appearance
of a particular defendant.31 The Bail Clause permits detention without bail, but
may prohibit any burden on a defendant’s liberty that is excessive “in light of
the perceived evil” it is designed to address.32 The Due Process Clause prohibits
pretrial punishment.33 It also requires that any detention regime be carefully
tailored to achieve the state’s interest and include robust procedural protections
for the accused.34 The Fourth Amendment prohibits any “significant restraint”
on pretrial liberty in the absence of probable cause for the crime charged.35 The
Sixth Amendment, finally, requires that counsel be appointed for an indigent
defendant at or soon after her initial appearance in court.36 It remains an open
question whether defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to representation at
the bail hearing itself.37

29.
Pierce v. City of Velda City, 4:15-cv-570-HEA (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015); Jones v. City of
Clanton, 2:15-cv-34-MHT (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015); Thompson v. Moss Point, Miss., 1:15-cv00182-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015); Walker v. City of Calhoun, Ga., 4:15-cv-170-HLM
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016); ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 4:16-cv-01414 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017). The
Department of Justice took the same position under the Obama Administration. See Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging Affirmance of the
Issue Addressed Herein at 3, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 16-10521-HH (11th Cir. Aug. 18,
2016); Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep’t
of Justice, and Lisa Foster, Director, Office for Access to Justice, to Colleagues 7 (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download.
30.
U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“[E]xcessive bail shall not be required.”).
31.
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
32.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987).
33.
Id. at 748-52.
34.
Id. at 747, 75052. The Supreme Court upheld the federal pretrial detention regime against
(among other things) a procedural due process challenge on the ground that it provided for an
adversarial hearing, guaranteed defense representation, required that the state prove “by clear
and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat,” directed
that the court make “written findings of fact” and “reasons for a decision to detain,” and provided
immediate appellate review. Id. at 751-52.
35.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975); Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 914
(2017).
36.
Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 199, 212 (2008).
37.
See id. at 212 n.15 (reserving judgment on that question). For a discussion of indigent
defense, see Eve Brensike Primus, “Defense Counsel and Public Defense,” in the present Volume.
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Beyond the federal Constitution, federal statutory law and state law regulate
pretrial practice. In the federal system, the Bail Reform Act lays out a
comprehensive pretrial scheme.38 At the state level, there is wide variation in
pretrial legal frameworks. Approximately half of state constitutions include a
right to release on bail in noncapital cases. The other half allow for detention
without bail in much broader circumstances.39 Most states also have statutes
that structure pretrial decision-making.
In the policy realm, the American Bar Association has codified standards on
pretrial release that represent the mainstream consensus among scholars about best
practices in the pretrial arena.40 Three core principles are worth highlighting. First,
wealth cannot be the factor that determines whether someone is released or detained
pretrial.41 Secondly, money bail should be set only to mitigate flight risk (not threats
to public safety) and as a last resort.42 Finally, the state should always use the least
restrictive means available to mitigate flight or crime risk.43
Ultimately, though, it is local implementation that truly shapes pretrial
practice. There is huge variance across counties with respect to the timing of
bail hearings, the presence of counsel, the qualifications and training of bail
judges, the resources allocated for bail hearings, the prevalence of commercial
bondsmen, the customary standards for bail-setting, and the availability of
alternatives to detention or money bail.
II. PRETRIAL REFORM INITIATIVES
A. REDUCING THE USE OF MONEY BAIL
Reducing reliance on monetary bail is a central goal of many pretrial reform
advocates.44 The use of money bail, by definition, disadvantages the poor; people
who have resources or access to credit are more likely to be released than those
who do not. This fact is not only unjust. It also means that money-bail systems
that do not meaningfully account for defendants’ ability to pay are inefficient at
managing flight- and crime-risk, and likely to be unconstitutional.45 Although
implementing procedures to assess defendants’ ability to pay may help, it is
difficult to assess accurately.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50, 3062.
Wayne R. LaFave et al., 4 Criminal Procedure § 12.3(b) (3d ed. 2000).
See generally ABA Standards, supra note 13.
Id. at 42 (§ 10-1.4(c)-(e)), 110 (§10-5.3).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 106 (§ 10-5.2).
To be precise, the core goal is to reduce the use of secured money bonds.
See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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It is possible to operate an effective pretrial system with minimal reliance on
money bail. The District of Columbia, for instance, has been running its pretrial
system largely without it since the 1960s. Nearly all D.C. defendants are released
on recognizance or with nonmonetary conditions; a small percentage are ordered
detained. For the last six years, appearance rates have remained at or above 87%
and rearrest rates at or below 12%—better than national averages.46
Replicating the D.C. model is no easy feat, however. The District benefits from an
experienced and well-funded pretrial services agency. Without that infrastructure,
limiting or eliminating money bail is likely to reduce appearance rates as well.
Such initiatives should therefore be paired with alternative methods of ensuring
appearance, such as court reminders or an expansion of pretrial services.
B. REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN DETENTION RATES
Black defendants make up 35% of the pretrial detainee population despite
constituting only 13% of the U.S. population.47 A second core objective of pretrial
reform is to reduce this racial disparity in pretrial detention. In order to pursue
this goal effectively, it is important to understand how such disparities arise.
First, arrest itself, as well as criminal-history information, may reflect
racially disparate past practices.48 For example, residents of heavily policed
minority neighborhoods are arrested for drug offenses at disproportionately
high rates relative to the rate of offending.49 Even superficially colorblind
methods of making pretrial custody decisions will embed these disparities.
This is not an easy problem to fix, as actual criminal behavior is unmeasurable
and decision-making in criminal justice has long relied on the criminal
record as its proxy. Nonetheless, educating judges about this type of
disparity (or using sophisticated risk-assessment algorithms to adjust for it)
may alleviate the problem.

46.
See Pretrial Services Agency for D.C., Congressional Budget Justification and
Performance Budget Request Fiscal Year 2017, at 1, 23 (Feb. 2016). Nationally, 16% of released
defendants were rearrested and 17% missed a court date in 2009, the last year for which data is
published. Reaves, supra note 8, at 20-21.
47.
Minton & Zeng, supra note 1, at 3.
48.
For discussions of the issue, see David A. Harris, “Racial Profiling,” in Volume 2 of the
present Report; Jeffrey Fagan, “Race and the New Policing,” in Volume 2 of the present Report;
Henry F. Fradella & Michael D. White, “Stop-and-Frisk,” in Volume 2 of the present Report; and
Devon W. Carbado, “Race and the Fourth Amendment,” in Volume 2 of the present Report.
49.
See, e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank McIntyre, Race, Prediction and Pretrial Detention, 10
J. Empirical L. Stud. 741, 759 (2013); Drug Policy Alliance, The Drug War, Mass Incarceration
and Race (2014).
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Secondly, bail judges may harbor explicit or implicit racial bias, which is to
say that they may set higher bail or place more onerous conditions of release
on minority defendants than otherwise similar white defendants.50 A typical
approach to measuring this type of bias is to see whether minority defendants
have higher bail than white defendants after controlling for variables like
charge type, criminal history, and age. Using this approach, many studies have
found evidence of bias.51 As the number and specificity of controls increase,
however, this measure of bias tends to shrink or disappear. Baradaran and
McIntyre found no evidence that judges set bail higher for black defendants
than white defendants once defendants’ specific charge and criminal history
were accounted for.52 Stevenson found no evidence that bail is systematically set
higher or lower for black defendants in Philadelphia, conditional on the charge
and criminal record.53 While racial bias certainly exists, differential treatment
of similarly situated defendants on the basis of race may not be a substantial
contributor to racial disparities in pretrial detention.
Third, racial disparities may result from differing levels of wealth or access to
credit across races. For example, Stevenson found that, in Philadelphia, only 46%
of black defendants with bail set at $5,000 (and who need only to pay a $500 deposit
in order to be released) post bail, compared to 56% of non-black defendants.54
Stevenson estimated that 50% of the race gap in detention rates in Philadelphia
is accounted for by differences in the likelihood of posting bail. The other 50% is
due to the fact that black defendants in this dataset are, on average, facing more
serious charges, have lengthier criminal records, and accordingly have higher bail
set.55 Similarly, Demuth found that black defendants do not have bail set at higher
levels than white defendants, but concluded that the odds of detention for blacks
are almost twice as large because they are less likely to post bail.56 To the extent that
racial disparities in pretrial detention rates are a direct function of socioeconomic
disparity, reducing reliance on money bail should lessen them.
50.
For discussions of the role of race in court decisionmaking, see Paul Butler, “Race and
Adjudication,” in the present Volume.
51.
See, e.g., Marvin D. Free, Jr., Bail and Pretrial Release Decisions: An Assessment of the
Racial Threat Perspective, 2 J. Ethnicity in Crim. Just. 23, 31-33 (2004); Besiki Luka Kutateladze
& Nancy R. Andiloro, Prosecution and Racial Justice in New York County—Technical Report
ii–iii (2014), www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247227.pdf.
52.
Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 49.
53.
Stevenson, supra note 5 (manuscript at 23).
54.
Id. (manuscript at 4).
55.
Id. (manuscript at 25).
56.
Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Decisions in Pretrial Release and Outcomes, 41
Criminology 874, 894 (2003) (finding that Hispanics generally have a higher bail set than whites,
although that could be due to citizenship status).
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Finally, racial disparities in pretrial detention rates can arise from disparities
in charged offenses and past criminal records across racial groups that reflect
actual differences in rates of criminal offending. It is extremely difficult to
isolate this source of disparity. But to the extent that differential crime rates
contribute to racial disparities in pretrial detention, the only long-term solution
is to redress the underlying causes of the divergent rates.
C. IMPROVING PRETRIAL PROCESS
Pretrial reform necessarily entails some changes to pretrial process. The
following five approaches hold particular promise.
1. Release before the bail hearing
Jurisdictions can reduce the number of people who require a bail hearing
in the first place by increasing the use of citation rather than arrest, and by
authorizing direct release from the police station (station-house release).57
The process of arrest is obtrusive, time-consuming, expensive, and potentially
damaging to community-police relations. Jurisdictions such as Philadelphia,
New York, New Orleans, and Ferguson have recently begun substituting citations
or summons for arrest for some categories of crime.58 Even for crimes that
require arrest, defendants who pose little risk of flight or serious pretrial crime
should be identified rapidly and released. Risk-assessment tools may be helpful
in identifying good candidates. Kentucky, for example, uses a risk-assessment
tool to identify defendants who are eligible for station-house release.59

57.
See ABA Standards, supra note 13, at 41 (§ 10-1.3), 63–74 (§§ 10-2.1–10.3.3); Rachel
Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 351–352 (2016).
58.
Mary T. Phillips, N.Y.C. Crim. Just. Agency, Desk Appearance Tickets: Their Past, Present
and Possible Future (2014); Bruce Eggler, New Orleans City Council Reclassifies Pot Possession,
Prostitution to Reduce Criminal Dockets, Nola.com (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.nola.com/
politics/index.ssf/2010/12/new_orleans_city_council_recla.html; Chris Goldstein, Philly420:
Marijuana Arrests Down 73 Percent, Philly.com (Aug. 7, 2015) (describing initiative encouraging
citation rather than arrest for marijuana possession), http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/
philly420/Philly_marijuana_arrests_down_73_percent.html; Consent Decree, United States v.
City of Ferguson, 4:16-cv-00180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016).
59.
See Amended Order, Authorization for the Non-Financial Uniform Schedule of Bail
Administrative Release Program, Sup. Ct. of Ky. (2017), http://courts.ky.gov/courts/supreme/
Rules_Procedures/201701.pdf.
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2. Slowing down the bail hearing

Currently, bail hearings in many jurisdictions are shockingly short: only a
few minutes per case.60 It is hard to imagine that two minutes are sufficient to
effectively evaluate the risk of flight, risk of serious crime, whether detention
or conditions of release are necessary, and, if money bail is used, ability to pay.
Taking more care during the bail hearing is likely to improve the courts’ ability
to evaluate risk and determine appropriate pretrial conditions. While slowing
down the bail hearing would, barring other changes, increase costs, a bail
hearing should only be required for defendants at risk of losing liberty. If more
people charged with non-serious offenses were released before the bail hearing,
the courts would have more time and resources to devote to evaluating whether
detention or conditions of release are necessary for the remaining defendants.
3. Providing counsel
Decreasing the number of defendants who require a bail hearing would also
lower the costs of supplying defense counsel to those at risk of losing their liberty.
Currently, many jurisdictions do not provide counsel to indigent defendants
at the bail hearing.61 Sixth Amendment doctrine holds that defendants have
the right to effective assistance of counsel at all “critical stages” of criminal
proceedings.62 The recent studies showing that pretrial detention substantially
increases a defendant’s likelihood of conviction and length of sentence support
an argument that the bail hearing is a “critical stage”.63 While providing counsel
at the bail hearing would come at some expense, the presence of counsel is
60.
See, e.g., Gerald VandeWalle, N.D. Chief Justice, 2013 State of the Judiciary Address (Jan.
9, 2013), available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/news/judiciary2013.htm; Change Difficult
as Bail System’s Powerful Hold Continues Punishing the Poor, Injustice Watch (Oct. 14, 2016);
Heaton et al., supra note 5, at 720 n.35. In both Philadelphia and Harris County, bail hearings
are only a few minutes long on average. Heaton et al., supra note 5, at 720 n.35; Stevenson, supra
note 5 (manuscript at 5).
61.
Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 Buff. L. Rev. 333, 389 (2011);
Pretrial Justice Inst., Pretrial Justice in America, supra note 22, at 8.
62.
Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 199, 212 (2008).
63.
See sources cited supra note 5. For additional arguments that defendants do or should
have the right to representation at bail hearings, see, for example: Nat’l Right to Counsel Comm.,
Const. Project, Don’t I Need a Lawyer?: Pretrial Justice and the Right to Counsel at First
Judicial Bail Hearing (2015); Sixth Amend. Ctr. & Pretrial Justice Inst., Early Implementation
of Counsel: The Law, Implementation, and Benefits (2014); Alexander Bunin, The Constitutional
Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 31 Crim. Just. 23, 47 (Spring 2016); Douglas L. Colbert et al.,
Do Attorneys Really Matter?: The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23
Cardozo L. Rev. 1719, 1763-83 (2002); Colbert, supra note 61, at 335; and Charlie Gerstein, Plea
Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1513, 1516 (2013).
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also useful to the system as a whole: lawyers can provide information that may
help a judge determine which defendants can be safely released. Furthermore,
initiating defense representation at the bail hearing would facilitate early and
more-effective investigation, plea negotiations, and case resolutions.
4. Information and feedback
The judges and magistrates who set bail may not be fully aware of how
their decisions translate into detention rates. It may surprise some to learn
how high detention rates can be even at relatively low amounts of bail. For
example, 40% of Philadelphia defendants with bail set at $500—who need only
pay a $50 deposit to secure their release—remain detained pretrial.64 While it is
conceivable that these detention rates are the result of well-considered policies,
it is possible that the magistrates are unaware of how difficult it can be for
defendants to come up with even relatively small sums of money. Increasing
the flow of information and feedback to judges, magistrates, and policymakers
is likely to improve pretrial decision-making.
5. Court reminders and supportive services
There are many reasons why a defendant may not appear in court beyond
willful flight from justice. A defendant may not know when her court date
is, have forgotten about it, or struggle to make adequate preparations (such
as arranging transportation, child care, or time off from work). For these
defendants, court reminders in the form of mail notifications, phone calls, or
automated text messages may greatly increase appearance rates. The available
research shows that phone-call reminders can increase appearance rates by as
much as 42%, and mail reminders can increase appearance rates by as much
as 33%.65 Entrepreneurial technology firms now offer automated, individually
customized text-message reminders.66 While the effectiveness of this type of
reminder has not yet been evaluated, it holds considerable promise. Finally,
improving court websites so that defendants can easily locate information
64.
See Stevenson, supra note 5 (manuscript at 12).
65.
Brian H. Bornstein et al., Reducing Courts’ Failure to Appear Rate By Written Reminders, 19
Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L. 70 (2013); Tim R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones & Dorian W. Wildermand,
Increasing Court Appearance Rates and Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date
Reminders: The Jefferson County, Colorado, FTA Project and Resulting Court Date Notification
Program, 48 Ct. Rev. 86, 89 (2012). These numbers, however, are best thought of as upper
bounds on the effect of court reminders. These studies were randomized control trials—the
“gold standard” in research—but only the “treatment on the treated” results were reported,
which makes causal interpretation difficult.
66.
See, e.g., What We Do, Uptrust, http://www.uptrust.co/#about-uptrust-section (last
visited Mar. 26, 2017).

34

Reforming Criminal Justice

relevant to their case should increase the likelihood of appearance. These
methods come at relatively low cost and offer potentially significant savings.
Jurisdictions striving to reduce pretrial detention rates can also reinvest the
savings by expanding supportive pretrial services. A pretrial services agency
can connect defendants to a range of social services to address underlying risk
factors like homelessness, joblessness, and addiction. It can also help defendants
manage the logistics of attending court (transportation, child care, work leave,
etc.). The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency provides these services, which may be
one reason for D.C.’s low rearrest and nonappearance rates.
D. EVALUATING RISK
Actuarial risk assessment is a common theme in contemporary bail reform.67
Reformers aspire to improve the accuracy and consistency of pretrial decisionmaking by assessing each defendant’s statistical risk of non-appearance and
rearrest in the pretrial period, and providing this assessment to judges along
with a recommendation for pretrial intervention. Pretrial risk assessment holds
great promise, but also raises concerns.
1. The promise of risk assessment
There is reason to be optimistic about the actuarial turn in pretrial practice.
Risk-assessment tools should reduce the subjective, irrational bias that distorts
judicial decision-making.68 They may also mitigate judicial incentives to overdetain by absolving judges of personal responsibility for “mistaken” release
decisions.69 They have the potential to bring consistency to pretrial decisionmaking and ensure that like defendants are treated alike. So long as the tools are
not opaque, they may improve the transparency of pretrial release decisions.
Risk-assessment tools also offer a mechanism of accountability: risk scores and
defendants’ outcomes can be monitored, and if the tool or its implementation
is resulting in unnecessary detention, inappropriate release or unwarranted
disparities, the tool or implementation rules can be adjusted.
Several recent studies argue that tying pretrial detention directly to statistical
risk can minimize detention rates while maximizing appearance rates, public
safety, or both. Analyzing a dataset from the 75 largest urban counties in the
U.S., Baradaran and McIntyre found that the counties could have released 25%
67.
For an overview of pretrial risk-assessment tools and their expanding use, see Sandra G.
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
68.
See generally John Monahan, “Risk Assessment in Sentencing,” in Volume 4 of the present
Report.
69.
See generally Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 417 (2016).
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more felony defendants pretrial and reduced pretrial crime if detention decisions
had been made on the basis of statistical risk.70 In Philadelphia, Richard Berk
and colleagues concluded that deferring to the detention recommendations of
a machine-learned algorithm in domestic violence (DV) cases could cut the
rearrest rate on serious DV charges (over two years) from 20% to 10%.71 Jon
Kleinberg and colleagues, working with New York City data, found that delegating
detention decisions to a machine-learned algorithm could “reduce crime by up
to 24.8% with no change in jailing, or reduce jail populations by 42.0% with no
increase in crime,” while also reducing racial disparities in detention.72
These are studies of policy simulations, not actual policy changes. There
has been very little research evaluating the effectiveness of risk assessment
in practice. One recent study showed that a law requiring judges to consider
the risk assessment in the pretrial release decision led to a small increase in
pretrial release, but it also led to an increase in failures-to-appear, and possibly
in pretrial crime. Furthermore, the study showed that judges ignored the
recommendations associated with the risk tool more often than not.73 While
risk assessments have promise, realizing their benefits in practice is not simple.
2. Concerns over accuracy, racial equality, and contestability
Pretrial risk assessment has also sparked controversy in the popular press. In
2016, news outlet ProPublica published a study that claimed to have discovered
that the COMPAS, a prominent risk-assessment tool, was “biased against
blacks.”74 It also opined that the COMPAS was “remarkably unreliable in
forecasting violent crime,” and only “somewhat more accurate than a coin flip”
in predicting pretrial rearrest generally.75 Finally, the article noted that statistical
generalization may be at odds with individualized justice, and that proprietary
risk-assessment tools like the COMPAS pose transparency concerns. These
critiques—regarding accuracy, racial equality, and contestability—represent
core concerns with actuarial assessment.
70.
Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 497, 558
(2012).
71.
Richard A. Berk, Susan B. Sorenson & Geoffrey Barnes, Forecasting Domestic Violence: A
Machine Learning Approach to Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 94
(2016).
72.
Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 23180, 2017).
73.
Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment 4 (June 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
74.
Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, ProPublica (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.
org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.
75.
Id.
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Debate about accuracy would benefit from an acknowledgement that no
method of prediction is 100% accurate. It is particularly hard to predict lowfrequency events like violent crime. The ProPublica article concluded that the
COMPAS was “remarkably unreliable” on the basis that “[o]nly 20 percent
of the people predicted to commit violent crimes actually went on to do so
[in a two-year window].”76 But that is much higher than the base rate.77 An
algorithm that can identify people with a 20% chance of rearrest for violent
crime provides useful knowledge.78 The policy-relevant question is not whether
a tool is “accurate,” but rather what statistical information it provides, whether
that information represents an improvement over the status quo, and whether
it can justifiably guide pretrial decision-making.
The concern for racial equality is similarly complex.79 The most obvious
source of racial bias in prediction would be if an algorithm treated race as
an independently predictive factor, or over-weighted factors that correlate
with race, like ZIP code, relative to their predictive power.80 But none of the
pretrial risk-assessment tools in current use utilize race as an input factor; the
dominant tool, the Public Safety Assessment, relies exclusively on criminalhistory information.81 Two people of different races with the same criminal
history will thus receive the same risk score. Nonetheless, risk assessment
can have disparate impact across racial groups. In fact, if the base rate of the
predicted outcome (e.g., rearrest) differs across racial groups, statistical risk

76.
Id.
77.
William Dieterich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and
Predictive Parity (2016); see also Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 70, at 561 tbl. 3 (finding that,
among all felony defendants in a national dataset, rate of pretrial rearrest for a violent felony was
1.9%).
78.
In fact, other pretrial risk-assessment tools classify defendants as high-risk at substantially
lower probabilities of rearrest. See Mayson, supra note 67.
79.
For a more thorough discussion of racial equality in risk assessment, see Sandra G.
Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out: Criminal Justice Risk Assessment and the Myth of Race Neutrality
(June 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
80.
See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges,
52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 231 (2015); Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of
Risk Assessment, 27 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 237 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the
Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 803 (2014).
81.
Laura & John Arnold Foundation, Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula
(2016), www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf.
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assessment necessarily will have disparate impact.82 This was the source of the
disparity that ProPublica documented: The black defendants in its dataset had
higher arrest-risk profiles, on average, than the white.83 There is no easy way to
prevent this result.84 Nor is it a good reason to reject actuarial risk assessment,
because subjective risk assessment will have the same effect. It is possible to
modify an algorithm to equalize outcomes across racial groups, but usually
requires treating defendants with the same observable risk profiles differently
on the basis of race.85
The third set of concerns with pretrial risk assessment is procedural. If
people cannot meaningfully contest the basis of their risk score, actuarial risk
assessment might violate due process by denying a meaningful opportunity to
be heard.86 This problem arises with proprietary algorithms like the COMPAS
and other “black box” machine-learned algorithms, although there are ways to
make machine-learned algorithms more transparent.87 A related concern is that
no algorithm will take account of every relevant fact about a given individual.
For this reason, most scholars believe that judges must retain discretion to vary
from the recommendations of a risk-assessment tool, and jurisdictions have
universally followed this practice.88
82.
Where base rates differ across two groups, it is impossible to ensure that predictions are
equally accurate for each group and also ensure equal false positive and false negative rates unless
prediction is perfect. See, e.g., Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact:
A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 Big Data 153 (June 2017), Jon Kleinberg,
Sendhil Mullainathan & Manish Raghavan, Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of
Risk Scores, Proceedings of Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (forthcoming 2017);
Julia Angwin & Jeff Larsen, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores Is Mathematically Inevitable, Researchers
Say, ProPublica.com (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/bias-in-criminal-riskscores-is-mathematically-inevitable-researchers-say.
83.
See Dieterich et al., supra note 77; Julia Angwin & Jeff Larsen, ProPublica Responds
to Company’s Critique of Machine Bias Story, ProPublica.com (July 29, 2016), https://www.
propublica.org/article/propublica-responds-to-companys-critique-of-machine-bias-story.
84.
This kind of disparate impact is not a constitutional violation; equal protection prohibits
only formal or intentional discrimination on the basis of race. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
85.
See, e.g., Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State
of the Art (May 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), arxiv.org/abs/1703.09207. This is one
manifestation of the difficulty of avoiding both disparate impact and disparate treatment. See,
e.g., Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1341 (2010).
86.
See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 80; Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets:
Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System (April 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920883.
87.
See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 633 (2017).
88.
But see generally Wiseman, supra note 69 (arguing against such discretion).
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3. Best practice in risk assessment

Given these concerns and the limitations of existing research,
jurisdictions implementing pretrial risk assessment should keep a number
of best practices in mind.
First, risk-assessment tools should be intelligible to the people whose
lives they affect. To the greatest extent possible, the identity and weighting of
risk factors should be public. Relatedly, tools that rely on objective data are
preferable to tools that include subjective components.
Second, stakeholders should take care in determining what risks to assess.
At present, many tools measure pretrial “failure,” a composite of flight risk
and crime risk. But these two risks are different in kind and call for different
responses.89 As a number of studies have demonstrated, risk assessment can attain
greater accuracy—and produce more-useful information—if it measures them
separately.90 Within each category, moreover, further divisions are warranted.
Some people are at high risk for flight because they have powerful incentives to
abscond. Others are just likely to struggle with the logistics of attending court.
The response to these two groups should be different.91 Likewise, most tools
currently define crime risk as the likelihood of arrest for anything at all, including
minor offenses. If society’s core concern is violent crime, then assessing the risk
of any arrest is counterproductive; people at highest risk for any arrest are not at
highest risk of arrest for violent crime in particular, and vice versa.92
Third, criminal justice stakeholders should also take care to communicate
accurately about risk assessment. If a risk-assessment tool measures
the likelihood of arrest, it is inaccurate to say that it measures the risk of
“new criminal activity.” Risk-assessment tools should be cautious in the
communication of risk assessments as well. Terms like “high risk” embed a
normative evaluation.93 To avoid unduly influencing courts’ or stakeholders’
judgment about the significance of a given statistical risk, an actuarial tool

89.
See Gouldin, supra note 23.
90.
See, e.g., Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 70; Kleinberg et al., supra note 72.
91.
See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining “Flight Risk,” U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript on file with authors).
92.
Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 70, at 528-29; see also Laura & John Arnold Foundation,
supra note 81 (using mostly different factors to predict arrest versus arrest for violent crime).
93.
See Jessica Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk for Sentencing (Aug. 12, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2821136; see also Crim. Just.
Pol’y Program, supra note 13, at 21.
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should report its assessment in numerical terms: “Statistical analysis suggests
that this defendant has an X% chance of Y event within Z time period if
released unconditionally, without supportive services.”94
Fourth, criminal justice stakeholders should confront the value judgments
that a detention regime guided by risk assessment will entail.95 Someone must
decide what degree of statistical risk justifies detention—if any does. Either
the developers of risk-assessment tools will make that judgment implicitly, by
choosing the “cut point” at which a risk is determined to be high and detention
is recommended, or stakeholders can make it and direct the design of the
tool accordingly. Similarly, any predictive system (including subjective risk
assessment) will perpetuate underlying racial and socioeconomic disparities in
the world, and stakeholders should determine how best to respond to this reality.
Fifth, it is imperative that actuarial risk-assessment tools are implemented
carefully and monitored closely, with rigorous data collection and analysis.
E. RATIONALIZING PRETRIAL DETENTION
A reform model in which defendants are detained based on risk rather
than ability to post bail requires that courts have authority to order pretrial
detention directly. In states that still have a broad constitutional right to pretrial
release, bail reform may thus require amendment of the state constitution.96
This poses significant logistical challenges and raises the difficult question of
when detention is warranted. In the 1970s and ’80s, when the first preventive
detention regimes were implemented, critics argued that due process and
the Excessive Bail Clause categorically prohibit detention without bail.97 The
Supreme Court rejected that position in United States v. Salerno.98 But it did
not specify what type or degree of risk is sufficient to justify detention, beyond
the broad principles that pretrial detention must not constitute punishment

94.
This is the “positive predictive value” of a risk classification. See, e.g., Chouldechova, supra
note 82, at 155.
95.
See generally Eaglin, supra note 93; Mayson, supra note 67.
96.
New Jersey has recently completed this process. Its constitution now provides that
“pretrial release may be denied” if a court finds that no condition of release would “reasonably”
ensure appearance, protect the community, or prevent obstruction of justice. N.J. Const. art. I,
§ 11. The state legislature has enacted statutory rules to guide these decisions. N.J. Rev. Stat §
2A:162–15 et seq.
97.
See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John
Mitchell, 56 Va. L. Rev. 371, 401 (1970).
98.
481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987).
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or be excessive in relation to its goals. Even if the Constitution imposes little
substantive constraint, the question of when pretrial detention is justified is
also a moral one.99
It is clear that some defendants should not be detained. To begin with,
detention is not justified if a less restrictive and cost-effective alternative would
adequately mitigate whatever risk a defendant presents. Samuel Wiseman
suggests, for instance, that detention should rarely be imposed as a response
to flight risk, because electronic monitoring will nearly always reduce the risk
to a reasonable level.100 A related principle is that detention is unwarranted for
defendants who pose little risk of flight or committing pretrial crime. The great
promise of risk assessment is to identify this group and ensure their release.
Finally, misdemeanor pretrial detention should be rare.101 Defendants charged
with misdemeanors generally do not pose a grave crime risk, and incentives
to abscond should be weakest in low-level cases. Some research suggests that
misdemeanor pretrial detention has lasting crime-inducing effects,102 thus
generating more crime than it prevents.103 Pretrial detention in misdemeanor
cases also appears particularly likely to skew the fairness of the adjudicative

99.
A few contemporary scholars have argued that pretrial detention based on general
dangerousness categorically violates the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Pretrial
Detention and the Presumption of Innocence, in Preventive Justice 128 (Andrew Ashworth ed.,
2013); Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 723 (2011). This
argument has no legal traction in the United States, because the Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence is merely “a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal
trials.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). As Richard Lippke has noted, furthermore, it is
difficult to specify what a presumption of innocence would require in the pretrial context. See
generally Richard L. Lippke, Taming the Presumption of Innocence (2016).
100. Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 Yale L.J. 1344
(2014). Wiseman focuses on money bail that results in detention, but the argument applies to
direct detention as well.
101. For a discussion of misdemeanors, see Alexandra Natapoff, “Misdemeanors,” in Volume 1
of the present Report.
102. See, e.g., Heaton et al., supra note 5.
103. Id. at 72 (finding that Harris County could have saved an estimated $20 million and
averted thousands of new arrests by releasing every misdemeanor defendant detained on a bail
amount of $500 or less between 2008 and 2013).
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process,104 because a guilty plea often means going home.105 Scholars speculate
that this dynamic may be a major cause of wrongful convictions.106
Beyond these classes of defendants, there is no easy answer to the question
of when pretrial detention is warranted. Some scholars have suggested that it
is justified when its benefits outweigh its costs.107 Others have advocated for
additional criteria,108 or community involvement in detention decisions.109
This important debate should continue. As a baseline, jurisdictions seeking to
craft new pretrial detention regimes should ensure that:

104. Misdemeanor defendants detained pretrial in Harris County, Texas (2008-2013) were
25% more likely to be convicted than statistically indistinguishable defendants who were not
detained, due almost entirely to the increased likelihood of pleading guilty. These results indicate
that approximately 28,300 defendants would not have been convicted but for their detention. Id.
105. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 277, 308 (2011) (“In such cases, defendants must generally
choose between remaining in jail to fight the case or taking an early plea with a sentence of time
served or probation.”); cf. Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process is the Punishment: Handling Cases
in a Lower Criminal Court 9-10 (1979) (reporting that in sample of more than 1,600 cases,
“twice as many people were sent to jail prior to trial than after trial”). For a discussion of plea
bargaining, see Jenia I. Turner, “Plea Bargaining,” in the present Volume.
106. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction:
Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 927, 930-31
(2008); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313, 1316, 1343-47 (2012). For
a discussion of wrongful convictions, see Brandon L. Garrett, “Actual Innocence and Wrongful
Convictions,” in the present Volume.
107. The most comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of pretrial detention concludes that we
could achieve cost-benefit equilibrium, detain 28% fewer people, and save $78 million by
adopting a statistical risk approach to detention decisions. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs
of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2017); see also David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal
Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 Econ. Inquiry
750, 760-61 (2011); Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23, 39 (2010).
108. See, e.g., Richard L. Lippke, Pretrial Detention Without Punishment, 20 Res Publica 111,
122 (2014) (arguing that detention on the basis of crime-risk is justified only if the defendant
is likely to commit a serious crime in the pretrial phase, no less restrictive means can prevent it,
and there is “substantial evidence” of the defendant’s guilt on a serious charge); Jeffrey Manns,
Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1947, 1953
(2005) (arguing that the state should compensate detained defendants for their lost liberty);
see also Mayson, supra note 67 (noting that there is no clear justification for pretrial detention
for dangerousness if the state could not detain an equally dangerous person not accused of any
crime).
109. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment,
and the Sixth Amendment, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1297 (2012); Simonson, supra note 26.
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• Pretrial release is the default, and detention is a“carefully limited exception.”110
• Detention procedures include, at minimum, the protections noted by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno (including an adversarial
hearing and right to immediate appeal).111
• Detention requires clear and convincing evidence that (1) there is a
substantial probability the defendant will commit serious crime in the
pretrial phase or abscond from justice, and (2) no conditions of release
can reduce the risk below that probability threshold. Jurisdictions
should specify what numerical probability qualifies as substantial and
what crime qualifies as serious for this purpose.
F. IMPLEMENTING NONMONETARY CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

In order to limit the use of money bail and reduce detention rates, bail
reformers advocate non-financial conditions of release as an alternative for
defendants who pose some pretrial risk. This section surveys the literature
evaluating three common conditions: required meetings with pretrial officers,
drug testing, and electronic monitoring. The emphasis is on high-quality studies
such as randomized control trials (RCTs). Evidence from the probation or parole
context is included if there is a lack of quality research in the pretrial context.
1. Meetings with a pretrial officer
The requirement of meeting periodically (in person or over the phone)
with a pretrial officer is one of the most common conditions of release.
Pretrial supervision is an expensive intervention, as it requires the time of
a salaried employee of the state. It imposes time burdens on the defendant,
and, in increasing the requirements of release, increases the likelihood that the
defendant will fail to fulfill them.
There is no good evidence to support this practice. A small experiment
conducted by John Goldkamp, in which defendants were randomly assigned
to low-supervision or high-supervision conditions, found no difference
in appearance rates or rearrest across the two groups, either for low-risk or

110.
111.

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
Id. at 751-52.
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moderate-to-high-risk defendants.112 An experiment in the 1980s randomly
assigned defendants to either more-intensive pretrial supervision or lessintensive supervision plus access to services (vocational training or drug/
alcohol counseling). It found no difference in appearance rate or rearrest across
the groups.113 Very little other research exists. A correlational study funded
by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation showed that pretrial supervision
is correlated with increased appearance rates but is not generally correlated
with reductions in new criminal activity.114 This study was conducted across
multiple jurisdictions that varied in their use of, and definition of, pretrial
supervision. Correlational studies are generally considered weak evidence, so it
is hard to draw firm conclusions from these results.
There are several well-executed studies on required meetings with supervising
officers in the probation and parole context. An RCT in Philadelphia that
reduced the frequency of required meeting with probation officers found no
effect on new charges or re-incarceration.115 An RCT evaluating the benefits of
intensive probation (which, among other things, involves extra meetings with
probation officers) shows no evidence that these meetings decrease criminal
behavior.116 The intensive supervision does, however, increase the likelihood that
a defendant will be re-incarcerated due to a technical violation, at considerable
cost to the state. Another study evaluating the effects of abolishing post-release
supervision showed similar results: a decreased likelihood of re-incarceration
due to technical violations, but little effect on crime.117

112. John S. Goldkamp & Michael D. White, Restoring Accountability in Pretrial Release: The
Philadelphia Pretrial Release Supervision Experiments, 2 J. Experimental Criminology 143, 154
(2006). They also include a non-experimental analysis that compares outcomes for a baseline
group in a prior period who were not under supervision against the experimental groups who
had varying levels of supervision. This is a weak research design, since the baseline data related to
circumstances and events from four years before the experimental data, and many things could
have changed in between.
113. James Austin, Barry Krisberg & Paul Litsky, The Effectiveness of Supervised Pretrial Release,
31 Crime & Delinq. 519, 523-35 (1985).
114. Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Marie VanNostrand, Exploring the Impact of Pretrial
Supervision on Pretrial Outcomes 15-16 (2013).
115. Geoffrey C. Barnes, Charlotte Gill, & Ellen Kurtz, Low-Intensity Community Supervision
for Low-Risk Offenders, 6 J. Experimental Criminology 159, 181-82 (2010).
116. Susan Turner, Joan Petersilia & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Evaluating Intensive Supervision
Probation/Parole (ISP) For Drug Offenders, 38 Crime and Delinq. 539 (1992).
117. Ryan Sakoda, Efficient Sentencing? The Effect of Post-Release Supervision on Low-Level
Offenders 4 (Dec. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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More high-quality research on the effectiveness of pretrial supervision is
needed. At the moment, the practice is far from “evidence-based,” and the best
available research shows no benefits. Indeed, the arguments for why it might be
effective are fairly tenuous. Supervision implies a watchful eye and the guidance
of a capable authority in troubling situations. Periodic meetings with a pretrial
officer are unlikely to serve these functions. If a defendant is engaging in illicit
behavior, she has every incentive to hide this from the pretrial officer, and the
officer has no knowledge of such activities beyond what the defendant chooses
to share. There are thus scant reasons to believe that meetings alone will have a
deterrent effect or that the pretrial officer will have the information necessary
to intervene if troubles arrive. Given its expense and intrusiveness, required
check-ins with the pretrial officer should not be considered a core part of the
portfolio of pretrial options unless better evidence emerges to support its use.
2. Drug testing
The use of drug testing during the pretrial period has been shown to be
ineffective at reducing failure-to-appear rates or pretrial rearrest rates in a
number of randomized control trials. These studies mostly date from around
the time when drug testing was broadly implemented: in the late 1980s and
1990s. A large RCT in Washington, D.C., showed that defendants who were
assigned to drug testing were no less likely to have a pretrial arrest or nonappearance than those who were randomly assigned to drug treatment or
release without conditions.118 Another sizable RCT in Wisconsin and Maryland
also found that drug testing had no benefit relative to release without testing.119
Several other randomized trials showed similar results.120 Unfortunately,
these results have been ignored, and drug testing continues to be a mainstay
condition of pretrial release.
The last decade has seen a surge of optimism about the benefits of drug
testing in the probation context. A famous study from Hawaii’s HOPE project
showed that drug testing paired with “swift, certain and fair” sanctions can
effectively reduce drug use and re-incarceration for people on probation.121 In this
118. Mary A. Toborg et al ., Assessment of P retrial Urine Testing in the District of
C olumbia 13 (1989).
119. John S. Goldkamp & Peter R. Jones, Pretrial Drug-Testing Experiments in Milwaukee and
Prince George’s County: The Context of Implementation, 29 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 430 (1992)
120. For a review of the relevant literature, see Marie VanNostrand, Kenneth R. Rose &
Kimberly Weibrecht, State of the Science of Pretrial Release Recommendations and Supervision
20-24 (2011).
121. Angela Hawken & Mark Kleiman, Managing Drug Involved Probationers with Swift and
Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’s HOPE 4 (2009).
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formulation, people receive immediate but light sanctions for each failed drug
test. Unfortunately, the successes of the HOPE program have proven difficult to
replicate. Multiple RCTs have found that drug-testing programs built on swift,
certain and fair principles are no more effective than status quo procedures.122
Drug testing imposes burdens on the defendant, who must report for
testing whenever notified. The state must pay the lab costs and the salaries
of the monitoring officers. Researchers may yet find the key to the effective
implementation of drug testing, but the best available evidence shows no
indication that it is worth the costs or intrusions.
3. Electronic monitoring
There is limited high-quality research on the effectiveness of electronic
monitoring (EM) in the pretrial period. However, there is growing evidence that
electronic monitoring reduces criminal activity for defendants in the probation
or parole context. (The evidence is more mixed on EM’s effect on technical
violations or return to custody.) Electronic monitoring has been found to
reduce crime relative to traditional parole for gang members and sex offenders
in California,123 although it increased the likelihood of returning to custody
for gang members, due to an increased likelihood of technical violations.124 A
study in Florida found that EM reduced technical violation, reoffending and
absconding relative to those placed on unmonitored home arrest; a subsequent
Florida study found that EM reduced probation revocation and absconding
relative to probation as usual.125 A high-quality study in Argentina finds that
122. See, e.g., Daniel J. O’Connell et al., Decide Your Time: A Randomized Trial of Drug Testing
and Graduated Sanctions Program for Probationers, 15 Crim. & Pub. Pol’y 1073, 1086 (2016);
Pamela K. Lattimore et al., Outcome Findings from the HOPE Demonstration Field Experiment:
Is Swift, Certain, and Fair an Effective Supervision Strategy?, 15 Crim. & Pub. Pol’y 1103, 1104
(2016).
123. Stephen V. Gies et al., Monitoring High-Risk Sex Offenders with GPS Technology: An
Evaluation of the California Supervision Program, Final Report vii (Apr. 2012); Stephen v. Gies
et al.. Monitoring High-Risk Gang Offenders with GPS Technology: An Evaluation of the
California Supervision Program Final Report vii (Nov. 2013). For a discussion of gangs, see Scott
H. Decker, “Gangs,” in Volume 1 of the present Report. For a discussion of sex offenders, Wayne
A. Logan, “Sex Offender Registration and Notification,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
124. See, e.g., William Bales et al., A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment of Electronic
Monitoring (2010); Kathy G. Padgett et al., Under Surveillance: An Empirical Test of the
Effectiveness and Consequences of Electronic Monitoring, 5 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 61 (2006).
125. The California and Florida studies used propensity score matching, which raises some
concerns that those placed on EM differ in unobservable characteristics from the control group,
leading to bias in the estimator. However, those on EM are generally higher risk than those on
regular probation/parole, suggesting that the bias would lead these studies to underestimate the
effects if anything.
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EM reduces recidivism relative to pretrial detention; other quasi-experimental
studies in Europe find that EM decreases recidivism and welfare dependency
relative to incarceration.126 Additional high-quality research is important to
assess the effectiveness of EM at preventing flight and pretrial crime in the U.S.
Whatever benefit EM provides comes at substantial cost. EM is a significant
burden on a person’s liberty. It places strain on family relationships, makes it
difficult to find employment, and can lead to shame and stigma.127 Surveys of
people serving sentences find that EM is considered only slightly less onerous
than incarceration.128 EM is also costly to the state. Purchasing the equipment,
monitoring individuals, and responding to violations entails considerable
expense. Many jurisdictions charge fees for monitoring that burden the poor
and often cannot be paid.129 Furthermore, EM can be overused. In one survey,
supervising officers believed (on average) that a third of the people they
supervised on EM did not need to be on EM because they posed no danger
to society.130 In conclusion: EM should be used selectively, and only as an
alternative to detention.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The pretrial system is ripe for reform. An optimal pretrial system will
maximize appearance rates while minimizing both intrusions to defendants’
liberty and pretrial crime. The central principle that unites best practices
in the pretrial arena is that any restraint on liberty should be tailored to the
specific risk a defendant presents, and should be the least restrictive means
available to reasonably reduce the risk. Given our existing knowledge about the
operation of the pretrial system and the effectiveness of pretrial interventions,
jurisdictions pursuing reform should prioritize the following strategies.
1.

Limit money bail as a condition of release, to prevent detention on the
basis of poverty.

126. Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Criminal Recidivism after Prison and Electronic
Monitoring, 121 J. Pol. Econ. 28, 28 (2013); Lars H. Andersen & Signe H. Andersen, Effect of
Electronic Monitoring on Social Welfare Dependence, 13 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 349, 351
(2014); Annais Henneguelle et al., Better at Home Than in Prison? The Effects of Electronic
Monitoring Versus Incarceration on Recidivism in France 3 (2015) (unpublished manuscript).
127. See Bales et al., supra note 124, at 89-95.
128. See, e.g., Brian K. Payne et al., The “Pains” of Electronic Monitoring: A Slap on the Wrist or
Just as Bad as Prison?, 27 Crim. Just. Stud. 133, 140 (2014).
129. See Bales et al., supra note 124, at 102-103. See generally Beth A. Colgan, “Fines, Fees, and
Forfeitures,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
130. Bales et al., supra note 124, at 104.
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2.

Substitute citation or summons for arrest where possible, and release
most arrested defendants immediately after booking.

3.

Conduct thorough hearings with defense counsel before imposing
detention or other serious infringement of liberty (e.g., electronic
monitoring).

4.

Detain defendants only if there is a substantial probability they will
commit serious crime in the pretrial phase or abscond from justice, and
if less intrusive methods cannot adequately reduce that risk.

5.

Use conditions of release sparingly, since few have been demonstrated to
be effective and many involve non-trivial impositions on liberty.

6.

Support released defendants by expanding access to services, providing
reminders of upcoming court dates, and making court websites easy to
navigate.

7.

Implement actuarial risk assessment cautiously and transparently, with
continuous evaluation by an independent third party.

8.

Pilot new pretrial initiatives in collaboration with an academic
partner, in order to measure their effectiveness and identify necessary
improvements.

These strategies will, of course, require investment, financial and political.
But they have the potential to produce significant returns for defendants and
taxpayers alike. If the momentum for pretrial reform translates into action, we
can inaugurate a more effective and more humane system of pretrial justice.

